President Trump’s recent claim at Davos that the United States has reached an agreement to apparently acquire or have some kind of ownership over Greenland should be understood less as a response to an urgent U.S. security gap and more as a problematic expansionist gesture. This narrative, contrary to the long-standing foreign policy over NATO allies and the most basic principles of international law, could suggest a broader political message: projecting regional capacity toward China and Russia, both of which are pursuing similar ambitions in their respective regions, albeit by different means.
Yet, what unfolds on Greenland could be deeper than the mere need to strengthen military presence or to have ownership over rare earths: some ideas indicate that the main goal could be to strengthen U.S. nuclear attack and defense systems, situation that could lead to global nuclear tension. Greenland plays a pivotal role in the U.S. nuclear capacity to respond and therefore is strongly related Trump’s “Golden Dome” project.
In any event, what the international community and the United Nations should advocate is the idea that the same security outcomes could be achieved through existing diplomatic and military arrangements, without challenging sovereignty or destabilizing alliances; as well as advocating for nuclear disarmament.
Greenland’s Strategic and Nuclear Relevance
Although there are no active U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland, its strategic relevance sits in three main points: the trajectories of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the U.S. nuclear defense architecture, and the proximity to its nuclear adversaries.
As exposed by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Greenland sits along most of the possible direct trajectories of ICBMs coming from Russia, China, and even North Korea, given the existing new technologies that allow ICBMs to change direction during flight. Missiles launched from Russian Tatishchevo complex or from China’s Yumen complex would fly over the Arctic to reenter near north Canada and reaching the U.S. in any major city. This reality becomes more pressing with the recent development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), which travel 5 times faster than the speed of sound, and are designed to carry multiple nuclear weapons at these extreme speeds, while maneuvering unpredictably. This significantly reduces warning times and the capacity to even react and defend to some sort of nuclear attack.
In addition, the U.S. nuclear defense architecture is apparently incapable of defend itself from a large-scale nuclear attack (100+ nuclear weapons) or in the event of multiple hypersonic glide vehicles. Existing U.S. radar systems, such as the sea SBX, face limitations in tracking missiles once they exit the atmosphere. U.S. Ground-Based Interceptors -missiles in the ground designed to hit an ICBM during flight- and Aegis Ballistic Missiles -missiles with better defense capabilities, tracking technology, and present mostly overseas-, are a major component of their nuclear defense architecture. Nonetheless, it is alleged that they lack the capacity to counter the vehicle in the air in a medium/large-scale attack or in the event of nuclear submarines in the arctic. Therefore new and improved radars or defense systems in Greenland could reduce this gap, reaching Trump’s goal in his Golden Dome project.
Lastly, and what is the most concerning reason in terms of nuclear strategy, could be Trump’s intention to place ready-to-use nuclear warheads in Greenland. This would pose a major problem in terms of peace and global stability, as it could represent a hostile movement as similar to the placement of nuclear warheads in Europe’s NATO territory. A world in which nuclear disarmament is urgent for peace, those intentions could eventually lead to us into a doomsday.
Concerns and nuclear disarmament
No consideration, even defense ones, fully explain Trump’s claim over Greenland. Greenland is part of Denmark, a NATO ally. From a strictly military standpoint, the U.S. already enjoys extensive access to the country under existing agreements. If Washington’s primary concern were defense, it could have expanded or upgraded its military presence -including missile defense systems- through diplomatic channels, particularly given that U.S. capabilities in the region have likely advanced since the last major tests of their nuclear defense system explained in 2023. Probably, Trump may possess technologies that he does not wish to share, even with NATO allies.
For that reason, this problem raises an international concern: Trump’s interest appears less about collective defense and more about an expansionist vision with a nuclear logic. And at a time of rising military and nuclear risk, global security would be better served by reinforcing arms control commitments, especially with Russia and China, rather than creating more tensions and questions over sovereignty in the board.
The renewal of the New START treaty and the eventual inclusion of China in meaningful arms control frameworks should be the urgent need, despite China’s recent rejection. Framing Greenland through a nuclear and territorial lens would risk global stability in a moment when restraint and diplomacy should prevail. In a world still strained by nuclear competition, prioritizing denuclearization, arms control, transparency, and diplomatic coordination is essential to prevent further escalation.